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A B S T R A C T
Around 40% of school leavers in the UK attend university and individual universities generally host thousands
of students each academic year. Bringing together these student communities during the COVID-19 pandemic
may require strong interventions to control transmission. Prior modelling analyses of SARS-CoV-2 transmission
within universities using compartmental modelling approaches suggest that outbreaks are almost inevitable.
We constructed a network-based model to capture the interactions of a student population in different
settings (housing, social and study). For a single academic term of a representative campus-based university,
we ran a susceptible–latent–infectious–recovered type epidemic process, parameterised according to available
estimates for SARS-CoV-2. We investigated the impact of: adherence to (or effectiveness of) isolation and test
and trace measures; room isolation of symptomatic students; and supplementary mass testing.
With all adhering to test, trace and isolation measures, we found that 22% (7%–41%) of the student
population could be infected during the autumn term, compared to 69% (56%–76%) when assuming zero
adherence to such measures. Irrespective of the adherence to isolation measures, on average a higher
proportion of students resident on-campus became infected compared to students resident off-campus. Room
isolation generated minimal benefits. Regular mass testing, together with high adherence to isolation and test
and trace measures, could substantially reduce the proportion infected during the term compared to having
no testing.
Our findings suggest SARS-CoV-2 may readily transmit in a university setting if there is limited adherence to
nonpharmaceutical interventions and/or there are delays in receiving test results. Following isolation guidance
and effective contact tracing curbed transmission and reduced the expected time an adhering student would
spend in isolation.1. Introduction
Globally, many countries have employed social distancing measures
and nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to curb the spread of
SARS-CoV-2 (Hale et al., 2020). In the United Kingdom (UK), the enac-
tion of lockdown on 23rd March 2020 saw the closure of workplaces,
pubs and restaurants, and the restriction of a range of leisure activities.
The education sector was also impacted, with schools closed (with
the exception of children of key workers) and higher education estab-
lishments, such as universities, delivering the end of the 2019/2020
academic year via online means.
In the summer months, the national implementation of strict mea-
sures transitioned to a localised approach, targeting regions experienc-
ing the highest level of transmission. As the number of SARS-CoV-2
confirmed hospitalised cases and deaths began to decline, many sectors
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of society cautiously reopened, with measures in place to reduce trans-
mission. Universities began to develop plans to reopen, with several
adopting a blended learning strategy of limited face-to-face teaching
combined with online lectures. Higher education in the UK comprises a
sizeable population of students, with over 2.3 million higher education
students enrolled in the 2018/2019 academic year across over 160
higher education providers (Higher Education Statistics Agency, 2020).
The amount of students results in a sizeable movement of students
nationwide at the beginning and end of academic terms (in addition
to international student travel). The migration of students contributes
to increased population mobility, which had already grown since the
easing of lockdown measures (Our World in Data, 2020; Google, 2020).
Thus, there is an associated need for careful management in order to
minimise the risk of seeding outbreaks in low prevalence locations.vailable online 29 June 2021
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lion cases and more than 120,000 COVID-19 deaths (UK Government,
2021). There is, however, a lower risk of severe outcomes in typical
student age groups compared with older sections of the population;
a higher proportion of cases are expected to be asymptomatic (Viner
et al., 2020), while hospitalisation and mortality rates are lower (Verity
et al., 2020). In particular, of 83,529 COVID-19 associated deaths in
hospitals reported in England by 1st March 2021, 573 (0.7%) were
20-39 years of age (NHS England, 2021).
Nevertheless, the typical contact patterns of students could result in
a significant potential to transmit the virus within their social group,
amplifying the risk of infection to staff members and those in the local
community who may be more vulnerable. Contact studies indicate that
students, and in general those aged 20 to 30, report higher numbers of
social contacts in their everyday lives compared with other age-groups
and occupations (Danon et al., 2009, 2012, 2013). In addition, as a con-
sequence of younger age groups more often experiencing asymptomatic
infection, there is the prospect of asymptomatically infected students
returning home at the end of term and unwittingly transmitting to more
vulnerable family members.
The data and science surrounding the SARS-Cov-2 infection is fast
moving, so much so that publications can rarely keep pace. This paper
was originally written in October 2020, and is a record of the state
of our modelling as of that time. At the original time of writing,
a small number of modelling analyses had already been carried out
pertaining to transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within universities, and sub-
sequent levels of COVID-19 disease (Christensen et al., 2020). These
modelling studies had been predominately US-focused (Paltiel et al.,
2020; Cashore et al., 2020; Gressman and Peck, 2020; Lopman et al.,
2020; Martin et al., 2020), potentially due to their earlier return. Paltiel
et al. (2020) modelled the effect of a variety of testing strategies on
the number of infections that would arise among 5000 students during
an 80-day semester. Cashore et al. (2020) and Lopman et al. (2020)
investigated the impact of testing, screening and isolation for Cornell’s
Ithaca campus and Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, respectively.
The size and set-up of UK universities can differ markedly to US
counterparts, influencing contact patterns and thus the spread of infec-
tion. Though the majority of prior work has not had access to realistic
contact structures within the university setting, Brooks-Pollock et al.
(2020) developed a stochastic transmission model based on realistic
mixing patterns between students and applied to the University of
Bristol. Other UK-centric work has included investigations into the
expected number of cases that may be present at the outset of the
autumn term in 2020 (Perez-Reche and Strachan, 2020), and a work-
ing paper looking at how mathematical approaches may help inform
the reopening of higher education spaces to students whilst minimis-
ing risk (Virtual Forum for Knowledge Exchange in the Mathematical
Sciences (V-KEMS), 2020).
Many of the previous studies of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in a uni-
versity setting have adopted compartmental modelling approaches, in
which individual behaviour and interventions such as contact tracing
cannot be readily captured. In this paper, we present an individual-
level network-based model framework for transmission of SARS-CoV-2
amongst a student university population, including test, trace and
isolation interventions. Contacts occur across household, study and
social settings, underpinned by empirical data where possible.
We find that maintaining strong adherence to isolation guidance
and engagement in test and trace could both curb the amount of infec-
tion throughout the academic term and limit SARS-CoV-2 prevalence
at the beginning of the winter break. The use of room isolation offers
marginal reductions in the total number of infections, as well as the
number of tests administered and time spent in isolation. Mass testing
can lead to significant reductions in the total number of infections,
though this strongly depends on the adherence of students and the test-
ing procedure implemented. Finally, resource expenditure (including2
time spent in isolation by students) generally follows a non-monotonicrelationship with the strength of and adherence to interventions. Small
increases in the latter can lead to increased expenditure. These results
show the possible impact of SARS-CoV-2 transmission intervention
measures that may be enacted within a university population.
2. Methods
We adopted a network approach to capture the interactions between
students in different settings, upon which we ran an epidemic process.
In this section we provide details regarding the (i) network generation,
(ii) data sources used to parameterise the network contact structure,
(iii) model for SARS-CoV-2 transmission and COVID-19 disease pro-
gression, and (iv) simulation protocol used to assess the scenarios of
interest.
2.1. Network model description
Our network model comprised four layers: (i) households, (ii) study
groups/cohorts, (iii) organised societies and sports clubs, and (iv)
dynamic social contacts.
Household contact layer
We considered contact networks for on-campus and off-campus
households separately. The network for on-campus accommodation
contained a hierarchical structure, from the smallest scale to the largest:
household (typically based around a shared kitchen), floor, block and
hall. We constructed the on-campus accommodation units to match that
of a representative campus based university. We assigned students res-
ident off-campus to households with sizes sampled from an estimated
student household size distribution (see Supporting Text S1).
Within a household, irrespective of on-campus or off-campus loca-
tion, we assumed a fully connected network. Thus, we assumed every
member of the household to be in regular contact with every other
member, with no variability between members. In addition, on-campus
students could make contact with other students situated in the same
floor or accommodation block. These contacts were randomly gener-
ated each day with a fixed probability (this probability was greater
for students within the same floor, compared to the same block; see
Table 1).
Study group/cohort contact layer
We assumed that the enforcement of COVID-secure measures within
the classroom was sufficient to prevent any transmission between stu-
dents in that setting. However, the study group/cohort contact layer
does account for the fact that students in the same classes are likely to
regularly study and socialise together outside of the classroom. To con-
struct this layer, we partitioned the student population into 84 cohorts
based on department and stage of study: first year undergraduate, non-
first year undergraduate, and postgraduate (see Supporting Text S2). To
generate the contacts made within each cohort, we used a configuration
model (Newman, 2010) to allow the specification of a desired degree
distribution.
Contacts in organised societies and sports clubs
A prominent aspect of the university experience is the presence of
societies and sports clubs. We allocated each student to between 0 and 5
such groups (further details in the next section). To construct contacts
within these groups, we applied a constant probability of forming a
contact with each other individual in the group, with that probability
differing based on whether the group was a society or sports club. These
links did not alter during the course of a simulation. We assumed each
social group met on three fixed days each week of the academic term
(meeting schedules could differ between groups), with all members
attending all meetings.
Dynamic social contacts
In this layer, we captured random, dynamic contacts made each day
with any other individual in the student population. Each day, random
connections were selected for each student according to a specified
distribution, dependent on their level of study (Table 1).
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Description of network contact parameters.
Description Degree distribution Source
Household (static) Fully connected Assumption
Within accommodation block
(on-campus only)
Floor contact: daily contact
probability of 0.1. Block contact:
daily contact probability of 0.05.
Assumption
Study cohort (undergraduate) Log-normal(1.646,1.590) Fitted from Social Contact
Survey (Danon et al., 2009, 2012,
2013)
Study cohort (postgraduate) Log-normal(1.211,1.128) Fitted from Social Contact
Survey (Danon et al., 2009, 2012,
2013)
Societies & sports clubs Probability of link with each
group member: 0.05 for societies,
0.1 for sports clubs
Assumption
Dynamic social (undergraduate) Log-normal(1.748,1.331) Fitted from Social Contact
Survey (Danon et al., 2009, 2012,
2013)
Dynamic social (postgraduate) Log-normal(1.223,1.125) Fitted from Social Contact
Survey (Danon et al., 2009, 2012,
2013)2.2. Contact parameterisation
We characterised the network structure across the various contact
layers by applying two different approaches.
The first method was a data-driven approach, using data from the
Social Contact Survey (Danon et al., 2009, 2012, 2013). The Social
Contact Survey was a paper-based and online survey of 5388 par-
ticipants in the United Kingdom, conducted in 2010. We extracted
records provided by 341 students, with a total of 10,275 contacts.
These data informed the network construction parameters for the study
group/cohort and dynamic social contact layers. We divided the data
according to level of study: undergraduate (282 students) or postgrad-
uate (59 masters and Ph.D. students). Part-time, remote and mature
students were excluded. We fit parameters for these contact distribu-
tions using maximum likelihood estimation via the fitdistrplus package
in R.
The second method was a subjective approach, used when we did
not have relevant data available to parameterise the given contact
layer. This was applied to the formulation of random contacts within
on-campus accommodation blocks and organised social club contacts.
We provide a summary of the network parameterisation in Table 1.
Study group/cohort contacts
We used student contacts recorded in the Social Contact Survey, re-
stricted to those listed as occurring in a work or school setting. We kept
entries specifying a duration of 60 min or more, occurring more than
once per week. We assumed that the retained contacts with these char-
acteristics would be reflective of contacts made in a classroom/study
group context. There were a total of 135 students with 2497 relevant
contacts (111 undergraduates contributed 2309 contacts, 24 postgrad-
uates contributed 188 contacts). We fitted log-normal distributions
for undergraduates and postgraduates independently, using a mean
and standard deviation parameterisation, acquiring distributions of
Log-normal(1.646, 1.590) and Log-normal(1.211, 1.128), respectively
(Fig. 1(a)).
Dynamic social contacts
We used student contacts recorded in the Social Contact Survey,
excluding those occurring at home and those occurring for the first
time. Furthermore, we limited valid contacts to those recorded as either
involving touch or lasting longer than 10 min. Finally, valid contacts
had to last less than 60 min, as longer duration contacts would be
captured by the cohort and society contact layers. A total of 206 stu-
dents with 2249 relevant contacts were included (168 undergraduates
contributed 1888 contacts, 38 postgraduates contributed 361 contacts).
Overall, undergraduates and postgraduates had a very similar num-3
ber of social contacts (daily medians of 5.19 and 4.9 respectively). Wefitted a Log-normal(1.748, 1.331) distribution for undergraduates, and
Log-normal(1.223, 1.125) for postgraduates (Fig. 1(b)).
Random on-campus accommodation contacts
Given the limited data available to parameterise a degree distribu-
tion for these contacts, we took a pragmatic approach and assumed a
low constant probability of contacts occurring in the broader accommo-
dation unit. We assumed these contact probabilities lessened for higher
levels of accommodation hierarchy. Specifically, we attributed a higher
chance of interacting with someone on the same floor (daily chance of
contact of 10% per student with each other student) than someone on
another floor within the same block (daily chance of contact of 5%).
We assumed no random contacts at the highest accommodation levels,
i.e. between separate blocks of the same hall, or between different halls.
Contacts in organised societies and sports clubs
We did not have the necessary information to parameterise contacts
within this layer using a data-driven approach. Therefore, we stress that
the values stated here are subjective and alternative proposals would
add to result variability.
We considered a community of 335 organised social groups, com-
prising 270 societies and 65 sports clubs. We allowed a breadth of
group sizes, randomly assigning each group a membership size of 10 to
100 (in increments of 10). We chose a monotonically decreasing prob-
ability mass function for the number of groups each student actively
participated in: 50% of students not in any group; 40% involved in a
single group; 2.5% for each of two, three, four and five groups.
Following group assignment, we established contacts between mem-
bers with a fixed probability of each link existing. We set these prob-
abilities to 0.05 for societies and 0.1 for sports clubs. Accordingly, a
student was likely to make more contacts in groups with large mem-




We ran a susceptible–latent–infectious–recovered (𝑆𝐸𝐼𝑅) type dis-
ease process on the network structure. Once infected, we assumed
infectiousness could start from the following day. We assumed an
Erlang-distributed incubation period, with shape parameter 6 and scale
parameter 0.88 (Lauer et al., 2020).
The distribution of infectiousness had a four day pre-symptomatic
phase, followed by a ten day symptomatic phase. This gave a total of 14
days of infectivity and a minimum 15 day infection duration. The in-
fectiousness temporal profile weighted the contact setting transmission
Epidemics 36 (2021) 100476E.M. Hill et al.Fig. 1. Cumulative distribution functions for the number of daily contacts for all students, undergraduates and postgraduates. Black dots and lines depict the empirical
data. The red solid line corresponds to the best-fit log-normal distribution. (a) Daily cohort contacts using a total of 135 students with 2497 relevant contacts (111 undergraduates
contributed 2309 contacts, 24 postgraduates contributed 188 contacts). (b) Daily social contacts, using a total of 206 students with 2249 relevant contacts (168 undergraduates
contributed 1888 contacts, 38 postgraduates contributed 361 contacts).risk (see the subsequent subsection on Setting transmission risk) across
the duration of the infectious period (for the full temporal profile, see
Table 2). It was based on a Gamma(97.2, 0.2689) distribution, with
shape and scale parameterisation, shifted by 25.6 days (He et al., 2020;
Ashcroft et al., 2020). Following completion of the infectious period,
the individual entered the recovered state (see Fig. S7 for a schematic
representation of the model).
Asymptomatic transmission
Infected individuals could be either asymptomatic or symptomatic,
according to a specified asymptomatic probability. There remains sig-
nificant uncertainty as to what this probability should be, however
community surveillance studies informed this parameter. The REal-
time Assessment of Community Transmission-1 (REACT-1) study found
approximately 70% of swab-positive adults and 80% of swab-positive
children were asymptomatic at the time of swab and in the week
prior (Riley et al., 2020a). Note that this included presymptomatic
infected individuals who would later go on to display symptoms. This
fell to 50% at later stages of the study (Riley et al., 2020b). To reflect
this uncertainty, for each simulation we sampled the asymptomatic
probability from a Uniform(0.5, 0.8) distribution.
There remains limited data available to provide a robust quan-
titative estimate of the relative infectiousness of asymptomatic and
symptomatic individuals. However, there are indications that asymp-
tomatic individuals could be less infectious than symptomatic individ-
uals (McEvoy et al., 2020; Buitrago-Garcia et al., 2020). Therefore,
we assumed that asymptomatic individuals had a lower risk of trans-
mitting infection compared to symptomatic individuals. To reflect the
uncertainty in this area, for each simulation we sampled the relative
infectiousness of asymptomatics compared to symptomatics from a
Uniform(0.3, 0.7) distribution. This was sampled independently to the4
asymptomatic probability. The sampled value was applied as a scaling
on transmission risk, applied evenly throughout the duration of infec-
tiousness (i.e. with no time dependence, see the subsection Probability
of transmission per contact).
Setting transmission risk
Attributing risk of transmission to any particular contact in a par-
ticular setting is complex, due to the huge heterogeneity in contact
types. We used a data-driven approach to obtain the relative risk of
transmission within each network layer. We then scaled these risks
equally in order to obtain an appropriate growth rate of the disease.
For each contact setting (network layer), the transmission risk cor-
responded to the probability of a susceptible individual being infected
over the course of the entire infectious period for an infected indi-
vidual with a relative infectiousness of 1, assuming the susceptible
and infectious individual were in contact in the specified setting every
day. The transmission risk was then scaled to obtain the probability of
transmission occurring across a susceptible–infectious contact pair on
a given day (see the subsection Probability of transmission per contact).
For household transmission, we used estimates of adjusted house-
hold secondary attack rates from a UK based surveillance study (Lopez
Bernal et al., 2020). We attributed a household secondary attack rate
to each student based on the size of their household. We sampled the
attack rates from a normal distribution with mean dependent on the
household size: 0.48 for a household size of two, 0.40 for three, 0.33
for four, and 0.22 for five or more. The standard deviation of the
normal distribution for households of size two or three was 0.06, and
for households of four or more was 0.05.
For transmission risk in other settings, we performed a mapping
from the Social Contact Survey (Danon et al., 2009, 2012, 2013) to












Description of epidemiological parameters. Note the transmission risk parameters correspond to the probability of transmission (to a susceptible individual) over
the entire duration of the infectious period for a symptomatic case.
Description Distribution Mean Source
Incubation period Erlang(6,0.88) 6.82 days Lauer et al. (2020)
Infectiousness profile Infectivity profile over 14 days:
[0.0369, 0.0491, 0.0835, 0.1190,
0.1439, 0.1497, 0.1354, 0.1076,
0.0757, 0.0476, 0.0269, 0.0138,
0.0064, 0.0044]
N/A He et al. (2020), Ashcroft et al.
(2020)
Proportion of cases asymptomatic Uniform(0.5,0.8) 0.65 Riley et al. (2020a,b)
Relative infectiousness of an
asymptomatic
Uniform(0.3,0.7) 0.5 McEvoy et al. (2020),
Buitrago-Garcia et al. (2020)
Household contact transmission










Society contact transmission risk Normal(0.12,0.018) 0.12 Assumption
Class contact transmission risk Normal(0.0,0.0) 0.00 Assumption
All other non-household contact
transmission risk
Normal(0.24,0.035) 0.24 Assumptionobtain a relative transmission risk compared to household transmis-
sion. To obtain the means, we used the central estimate of adjusted
household secondary attack rate for those aged 18–34 of 0.34 (Lopez
Bernal et al., 2020) and scaled this based on the characteristics of
contacts in different locations, obtained from the contact survey (fur-
ther details in Supporting Text S3). Standard deviations were set to
have a constant size relative to the mean. Transmission risks were
consistent across all non-household settings, except within organised
societies where we assigned a lower transmission risk to reflect the
implementation of COVID-secure measures that would be required to
permit these meetings to take place. We also reiterate that we attributed
zero transmission risk to face-to-face classes, for the same reason.
To calibrate the relative transmission risks to achieve an uncon-
trolled reproductive number, 𝑅𝑡, in the expected range of 3–4, we
applied an equal scaling of 0.8 to all of the transmission risks calculated
above (see Supporting Text S4).
Probability of transmission per contact
We outline here how the setting transmission risk, infectiousness
temporal profile and relative infectiousness of an individual were
used to compute the probability of transmission across an infectious–
susceptible contact pair.
For an infectious individual 𝑗 on day 𝑡 of their infectious state, the
probability of transmission per susceptible contact in contact setting 𝑠,
denoted 𝑝𝑗,𝑠(𝑡), was given by the product of four components:
𝑝𝑗,𝑠(𝑡) = 𝑟𝑠 × 𝑖(𝑡) × 𝑎𝑗 × 0.8,
with 𝑟𝑠 the transmission risk in setting 𝑠, 𝑖(𝑡) the value of the infectious-
ness temporal profile on day 𝑡 (Table 2), 𝑎𝑗 the relative infectiousness
of individual 𝑗 (taking either value 1 for cases that were symptomatic
during the infection episode, or the sampled value for relative in-
fectiousness of asymptomatics compared to symptomatics otherwise),
and 0.8 the scaling applied to calibrate the system to achieve (in the
majority of simulations) an 𝑅𝑡 in the range of 3–4 for the initial phase
f the outbreak.
.4. Isolation, test and trace
esting and isolation measures
Upon symptom onset, an adhering infected student would imme-
iately take a test and enter isolation for 10 days. At that time, their
ousehold would also enter self-isolation for 14 days (matching the UK
overnment guidance prior to 14th December 2020, when self-isolation
or contacts of people with confirmed coronavirus was shortened from
4 days to 10 days across the UK) (Public Health England, 2020).
solation was assumed to remove all non-household contacts for the
eriod of isolation.5
We assumed that an isolating student would remain in isolation
for the required amount of time, or until a negative test result was
returned. We included a two day delay between taking the test and
receiving the result. We assumed the test had 100% specificity and its
sensitivity was dependent upon time since infection (we used the pos-
terior median profile of the probability of detecting infection reported
by Hellewell et al., 2021).
In the event that the test result from the index case was negative,
household members would be released from isolation, as long as no
other members had become symptomatic during that time. The index
case remained in self-isolation if they had independently been identi-
fied via contact tracing as a contact of a known infected; otherwise,
that student also left self-isolation.
Forward contact tracing
The modelled tracing scheme looked up contacts for an index case
up to five days in the past. It was assumed that tracing took place
on the third day after symptom onset, following testing and a two
day delay to return a positive result. Thus, contacts may be recalled
up to two days prior to the onset of symptoms. We assumed that a
student would be able to recall all of their regular contacts for that time.
However, we assumed that the probability of a student being able to
recall their ‘dynamic’ contacts diminished with time, from 0.5 one day
previously, reducing in increments of 0.1, such that the probability of
successfully tracing a contact five days in the past was 0.1. Once again,
other assumptions could be explored and a wider range of assumptions,
collectively, would generate more variation in the results.
Contacts of a confirmed case were required to spend up to 14 days in
self-isolation (Department of Health and Social Care, 2020) (matching
the UK government guidance prior to 14th December 2020, when
self-isolation for contacts of people with confirmed coronavirus was
shortened from 14 days to 10 days across the UK). We set the isolation
period to elapse 14 days after the index case became symptomatic.
We give an overview of isolation, test and trace related parameters
in Table 3.
2.5. Simulation outline
We used this model framework to evaluate the transmission dynam-
ics of SARS-CoV-2 amongst a university student population during the
autumn term of the 2020/2021 academic year, and the potential impact
of both adherence to the guidance and additional interventions.
We ran all simulations with an overall student population of 25,000,
with 7155 students resident on-campus and the remainder off-campus.
Simulation time corresponded to 77 days, encompassing the length of
welcome week plus the ten week academic term.














































Description of isolation, test and trace related parameters.
Description Value Source
Duration of self-isolation if
symptomatic
10 days UK government guidance (Public
Health England, 2020)
Household isolation period 14 days UK government guidance (prior
to 14th December 2020) (Public
Health England, 2020)
Duration of isolation if contact
traced
14 days (beginning from the day
the index case first displays
symptoms)
UK government guidance (prior
to 14th December
2020) (Department of Health and
Social Care, 2020)
Delay in receiving test result 2 days Assumption
Dynamic contact recall For five previous days,
[0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1]. Zero
probability beyond five days.
AssumptionWe seeded the number of latent, asymptomatic and recovered indi-
iduals based on UK regional prevalence estimates for 26th September
020 and student flow data (we provide further methodological de-
ails in Supporting Text S5). We assumed there were no symptomatic
nfected students present at the beginning of each simulation.
Unless stated otherwise, for each parameter configuration we ran
000 simulations, amalgamating 50 batches of 20 replicates; each
atch of 20 replicates was obtained using a distinct network reali-
ation. We performed the model simulations in Julia v1.4–1.5. Code
or the study is available at https://github.com/EdMHill/covid19_uni_
etwork_model.
Our analysis comprised of three strands, assessing the impact of:
i) adherence to isolation requirements and engagement with test and
race, (ii) adopting a policy of strict room isolation for on-campus
esidents displaying symptoms, and (iii) mass testing. In each area of
nalysis, we reported various measures relating to the prevalence of
nfection and expenditure of resources due to intervention. The former
ncluded cumulative infections over the duration of the autumn term,
o measure overall disease burden, and prevalence at the end of term,
o provide a measure of risk of disease spread to the wider commu-
ity once students return to out-of-term households. Expenditure of
esources due to intervention largely focused on the time spent in
solation by students, a measure of burden on both students and the
niversity. We outline each of the three strands in further detail below.
dherence to isolation, test and trace
We varied adherence to isolation from no adherence (value 0) to
ull adherence (value 1) at increments of 0.1. This value was treated as
he probability that a student adheres. Whether or not each student will
dhere to guidelines was randomly set at the start of each simulation
nd remained fixed for the duration of that simulation.
Under full adherence, every student who was required to isolate
ould do so. Isolation was required if a student had symptoms, was in
he same household as someone with symptoms, or had been identified
s a contact of an infected individual by contact tracing. Additionally,
very student would also engage with test and trace. Under no adher-
nce, no students would isolate for any reason, or engage with test
nd trace. For intermediate values of adherence, an adhering student
ould adhere to all isolation requirements and engage with testing and
racing, whereas a non-adhering student would adhere to no isolation
equirements and would not engage with test and trace. As such, there
as no partial adherence to measures by individual students.
se of room isolation
For those resident in on-campus accommodation and suffering from
OVID-like symptoms, another applicable intervention may be the use
f room isolation. Successful implementation of such an intervention
ould require the student to remain in their room at all times. Suffi-
ient support for the isolating students is vital, including the delivery
f meals and other essentials, as well as rehousing those students that
eside in accommodation with communal bathrooms (those in rooms
ith en-suite bathrooms would be able to isolate in their own rooms).6
We modelled this intervention by assuming those put into room
isolation had no contacts. This extended the standard isolation mea-
sures, which still allowed contacts within households. We applied these
measures on the same day that the student reported being symptomatic.
We assumed students stayed in room isolation until the end of their
symptomatic period, irrespective of the test result received.
Mass testing
We explored the implementation of mass testing, varying the timing
and frequency of tests: a single instance on day 21 (end of week 2 of
the academic term); a single instance on day 63 (end of week 8 of the
academic term); regular mass testing every two weeks (on the first Mon-
day of each fortnight); regular mass testing on a weekly basis (on the
Monday of each week). Additionally, we varied coverage amongst the
eligible student population: all students, on-campus resident students
only and off-campus resident students only. We carried out sensitivity
to the underlying adherence to isolation measures by performing this
analysis for adherence probabilities of 0.2 (low), 0.5 (moderate) and
0.8 (high), respectively.
Students who had previously reported infection and subsequently
received a positive test were excluded from mass testing. We also
assumed that all tests were performed on a single day and those who
received a positive test result were immediately placed into room
isolation. Contact tracing was performed rapidly such that those con-
tacts who were both traceable and adhered to isolation guidance were
isolated from the next day.
In a mass testing campaign, the test’s ability to correctly identify
asymptomatic infections is an additional source of uncertainty. While
symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals have similar average peak
viral loads and proliferation stage duration, the average duration of
their clearance stages has been observed to differ (Kissler et al., 2020;
Uhm et al., 2020). Since the probability of testing positive is likely a
function of viral load, this suggests that symptomatic and asymptomatic
test sensitivity may differ. We assumed that the probability of asymp-
tomatic individuals testing positive was equal to that of symptomatic
individuals until the peak of infection. However, after the peak it
was assumed to decay more rapidly, such that the probability of an
asymptomatic individual testing positive 6.7 days after the peak would
equal the probability of a symptomatic individual testing positive 10.5
days after the peak (corresponding with findings from Kissler et al.,
2020, who estimated an average duration of clearance of 10.5 days in
symptomatic cases versus 6.7 days in asymptomatic cases). However,
we highlight that this is an area of considerable uncertainty. Future
studies detailing the testing probability of asymptomatic individuals,
and the specific relationship between viral load and testing probability,
would be a valuable contribution to this area.
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3.1. Adherence to isolation, test and trace
We assessed how changes in adherence to isolation, test and trace
interventions affected the spread of the virus within the student popu-
lation over the autumn term. We reported measures pertaining to both
the level of infection and the resources expended in implementing the
interventions (including time spent by students in isolation).
As adherence to isolation, test and trace increased, we observed
a lower number of total infections (the sum of both identified cases
and undiagnosed infections; Fig. 2(a), Table S3). Specifically, with no
adherence (equivalent to the absence of interventions), we estimated
a median proportion of 0.69 (95% prediction interval: 0.56–0.76) of
the entire student population would be infected during the term. In
contrast, with full adherence, the median proportion infected was 0.22
(95% prediction interval: 0.076–0.41). Irrespective of adherence, the
proportion of students infected was consistently higher for those living
in on-campus accommodation compared to off-campus.
Although increased adherence resulted in fewer infections overall,
this was not necessarily true for the number of infections present at the
end of term. We found that for adherences between 0–0.7, increasing
adherence resulted in a greater number of infected students at the end
of term, rising from a median estimate of approximately 1% of the
student population to almost 6% (Fig. 2(b)). In the temporal profiles,
at very low adherence levels, we observed the outbreak quickly spread
through the student population, peaking long before the end of term.
Increasing the adherence resulted in slower spread, so that the peak
occurred closer to the end of term and increased the end of term
prevalence (Fig. S8). For adherence levels above 0.7, the outbreak no
longer peaked before the end of term, hence the prevalence at the end
of term began to fall again, reaching a median estimate of approxi-
mately 4% (Fig. 2(b)). For all adherence levels, the majority of students
infected at the end of term were non-symptomatic (either asymptomatic
or presymptomatic). This was more pronounced for higher levels of
infection at the end of term (Fig. 2(c)).
The level of adherence also affected the resources expended due to
the isolation, test and trace interventions. We consider the amount of
time spent in isolation by students to be a significant component within
this (Fig. 3(a), Table S3). An increase from low to medium adherence
levels (0–0.5) resulted in an increase in the time spent in isolation by
adhering students. However, further increases in adherence (0.5–1) had
the opposite effect. Across all levels of adherence and averaging across
the student population, adhering students were expected to spend be-
tween approximately 5%–30% of their time in isolation throughout the
course of the term. Those students resident on-campus were expected
to spend a greater proportion of their time in isolation (up to 40%)
compared to those off-campus (up to 25%).
We observed a similar relationship for both the maximum pro-
portion of students isolating at any one time and the proportion of
the population tested over the term, initially increasing as adherence
increased, then falling again as adherence increased further towards 1
(Figs. 3(b) and 3(c)). The maximum proportion of students isolating
at any one time was highest for adherence values between 0.8–0.9,
on average peaking at between 20%–30% of the student population
(Fig. 3(b)). The median estimate for the proportion of students tested
during the term reached a maximum of almost 10%, at adherence levels
close to 0.7 (Fig. 3(c)).
The non-monotonic relationship between adherence and resource
expenditure is due to the interplay between the number of students
isolating and infections levels: if more students adhere, then more
students will get tested and isolate when necessary, increasing the
number of tests and possibly the time and number of students in
isolation. However, if the increased testing and isolation of students
causes a large enough reduction in prevalence over the term, this will7
lead to an overall reduction in the expenditure of both resources. Thistrade-off between isolation and prevalence can be seen in the temporal
profiles of infection prevalence and proportion of students isolating
(Fig. S8).
We note that, for a fixed adherence, there was significant variation
in infection and resource expenditure outcomes. This was primarily
due to the variability in epidemiological factors between simulation
runs, such as the distribution of initial infections, the asymptomatic
probability, and the relative infectiousness of an asymptomatic case,
all of which were randomly generated at the start of each simulation.
The different network structures contributed relatively less variation.
Results from a collection of simulations performed on a single network
realisation also displayed a large amount of variation (Figs. S9, S10).
3.2. Use of room isolation
Room isolation for symptomatic students has been proposed as an
additional measure of social distancing and control. Overall, across all
adherence levels, the added use of room isolation had only a marginal
impact on all previously reported measures related to both infection
levels and resource expenditure (Fig. 4).
We find that room isolation resulted in a small decrease in the total
infections throughout the term, with most pronounced effects at higher
levels of adherence (Fig. 4(a)). We also observe slightly higher levels of
infection at the end of term for mid-range adherence values (Fig. 4(b)),
but the opposite for adherence values close to 1 (once more due to
the interplay between the number of students isolating and infections
levels).
Adding room isolation also slightly decreased the time spent in
isolation and the number of tests required across all adherence levels
(Figs. 4(c)–4(e)). Room isolation also resulted in an additional outlay
of resources in the form of rehousing infected students where necessary
(if they did not have access to a private bathroom). Median estimates
for the total number of students rehoused ranged from 0 to 400,
depending on adherence levels. We observed a similar non-monotonic
relationship between adherence and the number of students rehoused
as previously noted for other measures of resource expenditure. The
number of students rehoused was highest for adherence levels between
0.6 and 0.8 (Fig. 4(f)).
3.3. Mass testing
We assessed the effect of mass testing on the total proportion of
students infected and the proportion of time spent in isolation by
adhering students. We did this for a range of mass testing scenarios,
varying the timing and frequency of tests, the coverage amongst the
eligible student population, and the underlying level of adherence to
isolation, test and trace. Each scenario was compared to an identical
scenario with mass testing removed. We report relative median values
for ease of comparison between testing scenarios.
In general, implementing mass testing reduced the overall propor-
tion of students infected throughout the term. This reduction was more
pronounced at higher adherence levels, with more frequent testing and
at a greater coverage of the student population. If testing could occur
only once, a test date earlier in the term (end of week 2) appeared
slightly more effective in reducing infections than later in the term (end
of week 8). Similarly, if only a subset of the population was to be tested,
the larger amount of off-campus residents (than on-campus residents)
meant testing off-campus residents only was more effective at reducing
infections than testing on-campus residents only. From the scenarios
considered, we found a greatest reduction in median infection levels
of approximately 87% for a weekly mass testing strategy involving all
students, with 80% of students adherent (Fig. 5).
The effect of mass testing on infection levels was also observed in
the end of term prevalence. As previously explained, the suppression of
growth can delay the peak of the outbreak and thus result in a higher
prevalence at the end of term (Figs. S11–S13). We observed this for
Epidemics 36 (2021) 100476E.M. Hill et al.Fig. 2. Infection associated epidemiological measures over the autumn term under differing levels of adherence to NPIs. Outputs summarised from 1000 simulations (with
20 runs per network, for 50 network realisations) for various levels of adherence to NPIs. In all the violin plots, the white markers denote medians and solid black lines span the
25th to 75th percentiles. (a) Over the duration of the autumn term, distributions for proportion infected relative to students resident on-campus only (green violin plots), students
resident off-campus only (orange violin plots) and to the overall student population (purple violin plots). Maintenance of nonpharmaceutical interventions and effective contact
tracing curbed transmission. On-campus residents were more likely to become infected compared to students living off-campus. For percentile summary statistics, see Table S3.
(b) Proportion of students in an infected state at the end of the autumn term. (c) Under each level of adherence, we display the median proportion of the student population in
latent (blue), asymptomatic (orange), presymptomatic (yellow), symptomatic (purple) infected states at the end of the autumn term; for a given adherence value the height of the
bar in panel (c) corresponds to the median point in panel (b). For percentile summary statistics, see Table S4.many of the mass testing scenarios considered (Fig. S14, Tables S6&S7).
However, with 80% underlying adherence, regular mass testing (at
any considered coverage) sufficiently suppressed the outbreak such
that prevalence levels were lower at the end of term than without
mass testing. This was most pronounced when all students were tested.
Similarly, a one-off test at the end of week 8 also had this effect, at any
level of adherence.
Mass testing generally increased the proportion of time adhering
students spent in isolation, in all but two of the considered scenarios.
This increase was highly dependent on the underlying adherence level,
with higher levels of adherence resulting in a smaller increase. For8
the highest adherence level considered (0.8; Fig. 5(c)), regular testing
of the entire student population led to a decrease in the time spent
in isolation, due to a significantly suppressed prevalence of infection
throughout the term. For lower adherence levels (Figs. 5(a) and 5(b)),
increased testing frequency and greater coverage resulted in a relatively
larger increase in isolation time caused by mass testing. This again
displays the non-monotonic relationship between the number of stu-
dents isolating and infection levels. At worst, weekly mass testing of
the entire student population increased the time spent in isolation by a
factor of nearly 2.5 if only 20% of students were adhering (Fig. 5(a)).
However, if 80% of students adhered, the same weekly testing gave
Epidemics 36 (2021) 100476E.M. Hill et al.Fig. 3. Non-infection epidemiological measures over the autumn term under differing levels of adherence to NPIs. Outputs summarised from 1000 simulations (with 20
runs per network, for 50 network realisations) for various levels of adherence to NPIs. In all the violin plots, the white markers denote medians and solid black lines span the 25th
to 75th percentiles. (a) Over the duration of the autumn term, distributions for the proportion of time adhering students spend in isolation relative to students resident on-campus
only (green violin plots), students resident off-campus only (orange violin plots) and to the overall student population (purple violin plots). Maintenance of nonpharmaceutical
interventions and effective contact tracing reduced the expected time an adhering student would spend in isolation. On-campus residents were more likely spend a greater proportion
of time in isolation compared to students living off-campus. For percentile summary statistics, see Table S3. (b) Maximum proportion of students isolated on a single day. (c)
Proportion of population infected by SARS-CoV-2 and tested during the autumn term.a relative median of 0.56 for time spent in isolation per adherent
student, corresponding to a reduction in the time spent in isolation by
approximately 45% (Fig. 5(c)).
4. Discussion
In this paper, we have described the construction and application
of a network model to characterise the transmission of SARS-CoV-
2 amongst a student population in a UK campus-based university.
Our findings suggest SARS-CoV-2 could readily transmit amongst a
student population within a university setting over the course of a
single academic term. Maintaining nonpharmaceutical interventions9
and effective contact tracing curbed transmission, however NPIs can
also increase the expected time an adhering student would spend in
isolation compared to not using such interventions.
Our findings demonstrate the efficacy of isolation and tracing mea-
sures in controlling the spread of SARS-CoV-2 if they are broadly
adhered to. Our network model results add to similar conclusions
drawn from analyses using compartmental models showing that the
spread of SARS-CoV-2 within a university student population can be
curbed by effective testing, isolation, contract tracing and quaran-
tine (Lopman et al., 2020; Brooks-Pollock et al., 2020; Enright et al.,
2021). This is also in line with observations outside of a university set-
ting, with the use of nonpharmaceutical interventions to control spread
Epidemics 36 (2021) 100476E.M. Hill et al.Fig. 4. Impact on epidemiological measures across the student population of including rehousing/room isolation as part of the intervention strategy. For specified
adherence levels, we compare two scenarios: one without rehousing/room isolation as part of the management strategy (red boxplots), and one including rehousing/room isolation
as part of the management strategy (blue boxplots). We ran 1000 replicates for each scenario. (a) Proportion of students infected during the autumn term. (b) Proportion of
students in an infected state at the end of the autumn term. (c) Proportion of time adhering students spend in isolation. (d) Maximum proportion of students isolated at any
single time. (e) Proportion of population infected by SARS-CoV-2 and tested. (f) Maximum number of students rehoused at any one time for the additional isolation strategy. For
percentile summary statistics, see Table S4. The addition of a rehousing/room isolation control measure generally resulted in slight reductions in central estimates and a narrowing
of distributional ranges across all measures.of SARS-CoV-2 at a national scale previously documented (Ferguson
et al., 2020; Davies et al., 2020; Keeling et al., 2021).
During the autumn academic term in the UK, some higher education
students were asked to complete surveys regarding their adherence
to isolation and tracing measures. Our study was completed prior to
such data becoming available, however analysis of these surveys now
offers us further insights. These empirical data indicate the majority of
students reported adhering to interventions. In particular, the Student
Covid Insights Survey, conducted by the Office for National Statistics,
collected information in three pilots during October and November
2020 that indicated student adherence to isolation, test and trace
guidance was in the region of 80–90% (Office for National Statistics,102020). For example, when students were asked what actions they would
take if they developed symptoms of COVID-19, between 85% and 89%
of students reported that they would request a test and between 82%
and 86% reported that they would stay home for 10 to 14 days (7 to
14 days in pilot 1). When students were asked if they would share
details of people that they had most recently been in contact with,
if contacted by the contact tracing service, around 85% said they
would be likely, or extremely likely to do so. Assessing our results
retrospectively, these data suggest that the results we have presented
with adherence in a range of 80%–90% are more relevant than those
outside it. In particular, results presented for very low adherence values
are unlikely to be relevant in light of this new information.
Epidemics 36 (2021) 100476E.M. Hill et al.Fig. 5. Measures of relative case load and isolation burden under the considered mass testing options. Mass testing was either not used (baseline scenario), a single instance
took place at the end of week two or week eight of the academic term (corresponding to simulation day numbers 21 and 63, respectively), or regular mass testing was performed
on a fortnightly or weekly basis. We present in each panel evaluations under adherence probabilities of: (a) 0.2 (low); (b) 0.5 (moderate); (c) 0.8 (high). Estimates in each scenario
were made from 1000 simulations for mass testing covering all eligible students (red), on-campus only (blue), off-campus only (grey). The left hand side of each panel corresponds
to the relative proportion (compared to the baseline scenario) of the student population infected over the duration of the autumn academic term under each mass testing strategy.
In a similar way, the right hand side of each panel presents data on the relative time adherent students spent in isolation. Full estimates are given in Table S5.Irrespective of adherence probability, we predicted that a higher
proportion of the on-campus population would typically be infected
compared to those living off-campus. In general, household sizes within
on-campus halls of residence are larger than those living in households
off-campus. As a consequence, a higher level of mixing is expected in
on-campus residences, with an associated increased risk of infection.
Halls of residence have been identified as environments conducive to
the transmission of other respiratory illnesses (White et al., 2003).
This outcome reinforces the importance of monitoring the situation
in halls of residence, in agreement with previous modelling work
using (Brooks-Pollock et al., 2020).
We also analysed the impact on the spread of infection of separating
on-campus residents who were confirmed infected from household
members (for the duration of the infected individual’s isolation period).
We saw only marginal improvements compared to not including the
intervention, presumably due to the minimal impact that an isolating
household will have on overall disease spread, regardless of whether in-
dividuals interact within the household. Furthermore, the practicalities
of such a strategy and the outlay on required resources may prohibit
it as an implementable option. In particular, it requires sufficient spare
housing capacity with suitable facilities to accommodate those that re-
quire rehousing, as well as a safe way of moving infectious individuals11
to their new rooms.Mass testing had the ability to significantly reduce overall infection
levels, however only if performed regularly and when adhered to.
We found that running a single mass test on the student population
had only a small impact on overall infection levels. However, it also
illustrated that the optimal timing of such a test was dependent on the
objective. Based on our modelling framework, if one was looking to
minimise the total proportion of students infected, then earlier testing
would be selected. However, an additional concern is the potential
risks of asymptomatic students returning home for the winter break
and unwittingly spreading infection to their domiciled community. To
minimise the prevalence of infection at the end of term, performing the
mass test later in the term would be preferable.
Our findings regarding mass testing strategies are in agreement with
prior modelling work indicating that mass testing of students would
need to take place at regular intervals, such as fortnightly or weekly, to
suppress SARS-CoV-2 transmission (Brooks-Pollock et al., 2020; Paltiel
et al., 2020). There have been calls that, before universities allow
students to return home, community transmission must first be curbed
and frequent testing subsequently provided (Yamey and Walensky,
2020). As an additional aid to help track and monitor the spread of
COVID-19 in their student and staff communities, several universities
have set up public-facing data dashboards in both the USA (Anon,
2020) and the UK (UniCovid, 2020).
































Where possible, we have taken a data-driven approach to parame-
terise the system and instruct heterogeneities we expect to be present,
such as in student contact patterns. Nevertheless, this work has made
simplifying assumptions and our results therefore have limitations.
Student numbers and estimates of regional movements between term-
time and out-of-term time addresses were taken from pre-pandemic
academic years; these movements may not accurately reflect the situa-
tion for the 2020/2021 academic year during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Additionally, we assumed there would be no students beginning term
with COVID-like symptoms, no transmission in face-to-face teaching
settings and no transmission to students from the wider community.
These assumptions may lead to an underestimate of transmission po-
tential, with relaxation of any of these assumptions likely to generate
a larger outbreak throughout the term.
We assumed, for simplicity, that each student maintained consistent
and unchanging household, study and social contacts throughout the
entire term. While the assumption for households may reasonably hold,
given shared use of communal spaces, one would expect less rigidity in
the study and organised social group related contacts. We also used a
fixed distribution for drawing random daily social contacts throughout
the term, whereas in reality we might expect the distribution of such
contacts to vary temporally. A set of distributions could instead be
used to capture these temporal heterogeneities, were the necessary data
available to determine the distinct time periods and parameterise each
distribution. Finally, the level of transmission through this network is
contingent on the behaviour of students and their compliance with
social distancing measures. We have assumed an uncontrolled repro-
duction number in the range 2–5 (dependent on the proportion of
students that are asymptomatic and the relative transmission rate from
asymptomatic infections); more precise values may be measured for
emerging outbreaks. In the event of student populations at universities
suffering outbreaks, there is scope for the network model framework
presented here to be used for real-time parameter estimation. Larger
values of 𝑅 are likely to result in a higher number of cases and greater
ressure being exerted on test and trace services earlier in the term.
Multiple refinements of the model structure are still possible and
ay yield a better understanding of the outbreak impact on the broader
niversity community. We have not included university staff members,
r infection to and from the local community. Students with asymp-
omatic infection interacting with elder individuals in non-COVID se-
ure environments may result in silent transmission of SARS-CoV-2
nto more vulnerable groups at risk of severe outcomes from COVID-
9. Similarly, given that older individuals are at greater risk of severe
ealth outcomes due to COVID-19 disease (Verity et al., 2020), in the
vent of widespread community transmission, staff and surrounding
ommunities would be likely to experience higher levels of morbidity
han students. Another aspect we have not included here is the presence
f other respiratory infections. Such an extension would permit the
tudy of test capacity requirements when levels of cough and fever are
igh due to non-COVID-19 causes, especially of concern in the winter
eriod; were such a scenario to arise it would apply significant stress
o the national test and trace system (Eyre et al., 2020).
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic the movement of students
o attend universities, creating large communities of predominately
oung adults, poses specific challenges in controlling transmission.
nfectious disease models may be a useful part of the public health
ecision-making process, determining the most appropriate interven-
ions to be applied in a university setting. Our work highlights a net-
ork modelling approach to capture heterogeneities in contact struc-
ure that are particular to the university student population and its
rojected impact on transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This model suggests
hat encouraging student adherence with test–trace-and-isolate rules
as well as good social-distancing, mask-use and hygiene practices) is
ikely to lead to the greatest reduction in cases both during and at the
nd of term; mass testing is also found to produce strong benefits in
erms of reducing infection, generally leading to a greater number of12
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